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Abstract
The two large scale crises that hit the world economy in the last century, i.e. the Great
Depression and the Great Recession, have similar outbreak and recovery patterns with
respect to several macroeconomic variables. In particular, the largest depressions are
likely to be accompanied by stock-market crashes. This study investigates the behavior
of the U.S. stock market before, during and after deep downturns, focusing particularly
on the tails of the return distribution. We develop two automatic procedures to identify
multiple change-points in the tail of financial time series as well as in the co-crash and
co-boom probabilities of different markets. We then apply our methodology to twelve
time series representative of the sectors of the U.S. economy. We find that regime
shifts in the lower tail of the distribution tend to co-occur before deep downturns. Our
results contribute to a better understanding of the origin and systemic nature of large
scale events to make policy interventions more timely and effective.
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1 Introduction
“September and October of 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global history, including
the Great Depression.”
—Ben Bernanke
The long economic downturn that began in late 2007 and is known as the Great Reces-
sion has raised new concerns regarding the possibility of a depression period (Eggertsson and
Mehrotra, 2014). This has produced a widespread debate about the differences and com-
monalities of these events and those experienced during the Great Depression of the 1930s
(Bordo and James, 2010; Stiglitz, 2015).
Both crises started in the United States, but had huge effects on the economy worldwide,
forcing national governments to extraordinary commitments. The Great Depression lies
its roots in the collapse of the stock market. The market exuberance of the mid-twenties
prompted people to borrow money and investing in stocks. This created a spurge in the
stock prices that culminated in the stock market collapse of the 23rd October 1929. The
losses suffered by the investors made them unable to repay their debts causing the default of
a large number of banks. The Great Recession is characterized by a similar scenario, but the
housing market was the playground in this case. People were buying houses with sub-prime
mortgages bearing high interest rates but guaranteed by the value of the house itself. The
fall of the houses price coupled with the inability of creditors to meet their obligations caused
large losses in the banking sector and among institutional investors.
Even though the origins are different, the Great Depression and the Great Recession are
similar with respect to the evolution of several macroeconomic variables, such as the decline
in GDP, investment and consumption and the rise of the unemployment rate (Bordo and
James, 2010). As noticed by Barro and Ursu´a (2009), stock market crashes provide important
guidance about the prospects for depression. They find, for 25 countries with long-term data,
that stock market crashes go along with minor depressions (multi-year decline of consumption
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or GDP of 10%) 30% of the time and major depressions (declines by more than 25%) 11%
of the time. Therefore, structural changes in the dynamics of the stock market can be used
as an early-warning signal of macroeconomic contraction. In particular, given the evidence
of heavy tails for the stock return distribution (Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965), structural
changes of the tail probabilities are important because they entail changes in the likelihood
of observing extreme events. In this paper, we study the tails of the unconditional return
distribution.
Change-point detection in the tails has attracted a great deal of attention in the last
decade. Early studies of Quintos et al. (2001) report evidence of changes in the tail heaviness
for three Asian countries during the Asian financial crises of the mid-nineties. Candelon
and Straetmans (2006) extend the test of Quintos et al. (2001) to multiple change-points
and apply it to Asian and Western exchange rate data to assess the impact of monetary
policies. A different but related approach has been used in Bee et al. (2015) to uncover tail
seasonality in several U.S. industries. Straetmans et al. (2008) generalize these frameworks
to the bivariate joint distribution and propose to test changes in the co-crash probability
(joint lower tail) and co-boom probability (joint upper tail) between two assets. This test
can be used to understand changes in the probability of contagion or joint crashes.
We rely on these techniques to investigate whether the tails of the unconditional return
distribution of twelve financial time series providing a market proxy of the U.S. economic
sectors behaved differently during the Great Recession and the Great depression. The avail-
ability of stock market data for almost a century allows for an integrated analysis of the two
crises that would not be otherwise possible with standard long-run economic data. We de-
velop a new algorithm based on the test of Kim et al. (2009) to detect and estimate multiple
change-points in the tails of the time series of the U.S. economic sectors over the last century.
This allows us to evaluate which sectors were more prone to extreme events during the two
crises and the diffusion pattern of regime shifts in the negative tail of returns across sectors.
In the spirit of Straetmans et al. (2008), we then extend our methodological approach to
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the multivariate framework to shed more light on the contagion pattern of the crisis. We
perform a bivariate analysis aimed at identifying multiple change-points in the co-crash and
co-boom probabilities across sectors. As a consequence, we can evaluate tail spillovers and
contagion, along with the implications for systemic risk.
Both the univariate and bivariate approaches rely on an algorithm for multiple change-
point detection. Therefore, it is not necessary to specify in advance the dates of the tail
structural breaks. This constitutes an advantage as we let the data speak for themselves
without interfering with the statistical properties of the time series. We find several change-
points in both the upper and lower tails of the different sectors and changes in the co-crash
and co-boom probabilities. All the structural breaks can be justified on strong economical
basis as they correspond to the main economic events that characterized the nineteenth
century and the first decade of the new millennium. We focus our discussion on the change-
points close to the Great Depression and the Great Recession in order to see how the two
crises affected the economy and whether the policy responses were effective.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, all the economic sectors are
affected by the two crises, both at the univariate level, with an increase of extreme events,
and at the multivariate level, with an increase in the probability of co-crash and systemic
risk. Second, the change-points tend to anticipate the crucial dates of the two crises, so that
the detection of tail change points can be used as early warnings for large scale financial
crisis. Change-points in the financial sector occur earlier than in the others in both crises,
consistently with the fact that the banking industry was at the core of the crises’ origins.
Finally, the recovery time, defined as the time elapsed before another change-point occurs,
is different in the two cases, and we suggest to relate it to the effectiveness of the policies
implemented by the US government.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric
model and the change-point algorithms. Section 3 illustrates the results of the univariate
and bivariate empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Methodology
As our analysis covers both the univariate and bivariate case, we first define the econometric
model describing the dynamic of the assets considered, i.e. the economic sectors. We then
describe the strategy used to identify multiple change-points in the upper and lower tails of
a single asset and in the co-crash and co-boom probabilities of two assets.
2.1 Econometric model
Let pj,t be the logarithmic price of the j-th asset at time t, with j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Assume
that the marginal distribution of the j-th daily log-return rj,t = pj,t−pj,t−1 follows a GARCH
process (Bollerslev, 1986):
rj,t = σj,tj,t,
σ2j,t = ωj + αj
2
j,t−1 + βjσ
2
j,t−1,
(1)
with dependence structure defined by t = [1,t, . . . , K,t] ∼ iid F . In what follows, we drop
the subscript j and simply refer to rt for convenience, unless this comes at the expense of
clarity.
Carrasco and Chen (2002) prove that the process in Equation (1) satisfies the β-mixing
condition
β(l) = sup
m
E
{
sup
A∈F∞m+l+1
|P (A|Fm1 )− P (A)|
}
l→∞−→ 0, (2)
with Fml = E{rt : t = l, . . . ,m}, F∞l = E{rt : t = m,m + 1, . . . } and E{·} denoting the
information set. Mikosch and Starica (2000) prove that the marginal distribution of rt is
regularly varying, thus it presents power-law tail behavior with tail index 1/ξ:
P (rt > x) = L(x)x−1/ξ as x→∞, (3)
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with L(x) a slowly varying function, i.e. such that L(dx)/L(x) → 1 as x → ∞ with d
constant.
2.2 Tail change-points identification
Let the sequence {rt}nt=1 be a sequence following the process described in Equation (1). To
identify a structural change in the tail index ξ we consider the hypotheses
H0 : ξ1, . . . , ξn = ξ H1 : Not H0. (4)
Note that one can investigate both tails of rt over time by looking for changes in the tail
index of the sequence rt and the negated sequence −rt, respectively. To test the hypothesis
(4), Kim et al. (2009) suggest the following cusum-type statistic
Tn =
1√
nτ
max
λn≤l≤(1−λ)n
∣∣∣∣∣
l∑
t=1
I(rt > qτ )− l
n
n∑
t=1
I(rt > qτ ),
∣∣∣∣∣ (5)
where I(·) is the indicator function, qτ is the τth sample quantile of {rt} with τ close to one,
l are the candidate change-points, and λ is set equal to a small positive value to prevent
intervals becoming too small. Assuming that conditions (2) and (3) hold, Kim et al. (2009)
show that under H0,
1√
(1 + ω)
Tn
n→∞−→ B (6)
where B is the distribution of sup0≤t≤1 |B(t)| with B(t) a Brownian Bridge and ω is a
parameter that corrects the test for the dependence in the time series of returns (Quintos
et al., 2001).
To identify multiple change-points in the return sequence, we implement a new sequen-
tial strategy that returns both the optimal number m of change-points and their loca-
tions lˆ1, . . . , lˆm. First, we carry out the test in equation (5) over the whole sequence rt.
If Tn < Bα, where Bα is the (1-α)-quantile of B, then there is no change-point and the
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procedure terminates. Otherwise, H0 is rejected and the first change-point is set to be
lˆ1 = arg maxl
∣∣∣∑lt=1 I(rt > qτ )− ln∑nt=1 I(rt > qτ )∣∣∣. Multiple change-points are obtained
performing the test in Equation (5) iteratively over the sub-intervals of length s defined by
the change-points identified at the (m − 1)th iteration on rt, and setting the mth change-
point equal to lˆm = arg maxl
∣∣∣∑lt=1 I(rt > qτ )− ls∑st=1 I(rt > qτ )∣∣∣, if H0 is rejected at the
level α/(m + 1). This iterative procedure continues until the test fails to reject the null
in each segment, or when the shortest segment defined by adding another change-point is
shorter than λn.
Once the change-points are identified, we can study the different tail regimes using the
peaks-over-thresholds method (Embrechts et al., 1997). Let {Xt} be a sequence of iid obser-
vations with marginal distribution F endowed with upper end point υF := sup{ηt : F (ηt) <
1}. Given a high threshold u, u < υF , Pickands (1975) shows that when u → υF , the dis-
tribution of the excesses (Xt − u)+ converges to a Generalized Pareto (GP) distribution G
with shape parameter ξ and scale parameter ν > 0. That is, P (Xt − u ≤ x|Xt > u) goes to
G(x; ξ, ν) =

1− {1 + ξx/ν}− 1ξ for ξ 6= 0
1− exp {−x/ν} for ξ = 0
(7)
as u→ υF . When ξ > 0, F has Pareto-type upper tail with tail index 1/ξ corresponding to
the power-law behavior of Equation 3.
For each tail regime, corresponding to an interval defined by the change-points, the
excesses wt = (rt − u)+ over a high threshold u are identified, and the parameters (ξ, ν) of
the GP distribution are estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML). Note that the sequence
{rt} is not independent, as it follows a GARCH process. Under the β-mixing condition of
Equation (2) and some mild assumptions on the slowly varying function in Equation (3),
Drees (2000) prove the consistency and asymptotic normality of the ML estimator of the GP
distribution.
In the empirical analysis, we will consider a threshold level u and a quantile qτ corre-
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sponding to the 95th quantile of the time series considered, unless otherwise stated. Note
that we will use the return time series rt to identify change-points in the upper tail and the
negated return series −rt to identify change-points in the lower tail.
2.3 Co-crash and co-boom change-points identification
Following the intuition of Straetmans et al. (2008), we extend the change-points identification
procedure presented in Section 2.2 to the bivariate framework. In contrast to Straetmans
et al. (2008), when applied to the joint lower and joint upper tails, this approach allows us
to identify change-points in the co-crash and co-boom probabilities automatically, without
the need of specifying exogenously the date of the structural break.
Let {r1,t}nt=1 and {r2,t}nt=1 be the returns at time t for two assets with joint distribution
G1,2(·, ·). We define the co-boom probability as
τUPq = P (r1,t > q, r2,t > q) = G1,2(q, q), (8)
for a high quantile level q such that G1,2(q, q) is close to zero, where G(·, ·) is the counter-
cumulative distribution function. Note that an analogous definition of the co-crash proba-
bility τLOWq can be obtained substituting rt with the negated returns −rt and inverting the
dependence structure G1,2(·, ·). The discussion that follows equally applies to both proba-
bilities so we will generally discard the marks UP and LOW .
In order to estimate the co-crash and co-boom probabilities, we rely on the semi-parametric
approach devised by Ledford and Tawn (1996). The method consists in applying the prob-
ability integral transform to the series so as to obtain stationary unit-Fre´chet series,
y1,t = − 1
log[Ĝ1(r1,t)]
, y2,t = − 1
log[Ĝ2(r2,t)]
,
where Ĝ1 and Ĝ2 are the empirical distribution functions. Next define the sequence of
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pairwise minima {ymin,t}nt=1 as ymin,t = min(y1,t, y2,t). As y1,t and y2,t are Fre´chet, ymin is
regularly varying, i.e.
P (ymin > x) = L(x)x−1/η,
with L(x) a slowly varying function. This brings us back to the univariate framework of
Equation (3), but now the tail index 1/η measures not only the tail thickness of ymin but
also the dependence of the pair (r1,t, r2,t) in the tail region [q,∞) × [q,∞). The higher the
value of η, the higher the probability of a co-crash or a co-boom.
To identify multiple change-points, we resort to the algorithm defined for the univariate
framework in Section 2.2. Therefore we use the test statistics (5) to test the hypothesis
H0 : η1, . . . , ηn = η, H1 : Not H0. (9)
Note that, as a result of the transformation of the original series to unit-Fre´chet, ymin,t does
not have a GARCH structure anymore. In particular, there is no dependence in the first
moment of the original series, and the possible dependence between the squares vanishes
because of both the unit-Fre´chet transformation and the fact that we are working with
pairwise minima. Consequently, we simply treat the observations as independent, so that
under H0, according to (6),
Tn
n→∞−→ B,
where B is the distribution of sup0≤t≤1 |B(t)| with B(t) a Brownian Bridge.
Once the change-points are identified, we can study the different regimes of the co-crash
and co-boom probabilities estimating the parameter η with the Hill (1975) estimator. We will
refer throughout to ηUP and ηLOW respectively as the co-boom parameter and the co-crash
parameter.
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3 A comparison of the Great Depression and the Great
Recession
3.1 An historical review
The nineteenth century has been the stage of multiple stock market crashes, but none rivals
the size and magnitude of the stock market collapse occurred on October 23, 1929. As
early as in 1924, the Dow Jones Industrial Average started a long positive trend arriving
at quadrupling its value in 1929. The exuberance of the market attracted investors chasing
profits investing on margin with borrowed money. During this time, 40% of bank loans
were used in order to purchase stocks. On October 23rd, 1929 the stock prices suddenly
plummeted. Although the investors holding stocks were greatly affected, the segment that
quite possibly was most hit was the banking sector.
The 2000 era opened with the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression,
the Great Recession, that grounds its foundation in the housing market crash. The causes
of this collapse can be ascribed to the proliferation of sub-prime mortgages to individuals
with low creditworthiness and the spread of structured products such as asset-backed and
mortgage-backed securities among investors. The creditors’ insolvency forced several banks
to absorb billions of dollars in losses. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and other large
financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch, AIG, Freddie Mae and Fannie Mac came very
close to following suit.
Both crises were characterized by a substantial decrease in GPD, however the magnitude
of the decline was higher during the Great Depression. From 1929 to 1933 the real GDP
fell in the U.S. by close to 30 percent, whereas between 2007-2009 it fell by a little over 5
percent (Bordo and James, 2010). Similarly, the unemployment rate in the U.S. peaked at
25 percent in 1933 versus a little above 10 percent in 2009. Although the two crises present
similar characteristics, the policies implemented to guarantee the recovery are different.
During the Great Depression, financial markets presented a low degree of regulation and
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this led to the release of important acts with the aim of reforming the banking sector and
to the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). At the same time,
to stimulate the economy, President Roosevelt delivered a series of programs that are now
known under the name of New Deal. During the Great Recession, the U.S. government
heavily relied on fiscal policy to influence the economy and established an asset purchasing
program fron financial institutions called TARP to strength the financial sector.
3.2 Data description
Before applying the statistical procedures presented in Section 2, we describe the features
of data. As a market-based proxy of the U.S. economics sectors, we consider the daily
returns of 12 equally-weighted industry portfolios available in the Kenneth R. French data
library. The dataset contains records from 1923 to 2013 and has been created from the CRSP
database, assigning each NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock to an industry portfolio based
on its four-digit SIC code. We consider an equally-weighted portfolio, but it would have
been possible to use a value-weighted portfolio. We prefer to stick to the former because we
aim at capturing a sector-wide behavior, and giving too much weight to highly capitalized
firms might result in a portfolio with too much idiosyncratic risk. However, an unreported
analysis of the value-weighted portfolios reveals that the change-points are qualitatively the
same, especially those occurring in the proximity of the Great Depression and the Great
Recession.
The sectors considered are listed in Table 1 along with summary statistics. The means
and standard deviations are comparable to those observed in other studies. The skewness and
kurtosis coefficients suggest a substantial degree of asymmetry and lepto-kurtosis in the shape
of the distribution of these returns. The tail index for both the tails of the unconditional
return distribution are positive across the sectors, consistently with the theoretical model
put forth in Section 2.1.
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Table 1: Data description. For each sector, we report the abbreviation (Abbrv.), the
empirical estimates of the mean, the standard deviation (Std. dev.), the skewness (Skew.)
and the kurtosis (Kurt.), and the ML estimates of the tail parameter ξ obtained by fitting
the GP distribution above the 99th quantile of the upper (ξUP ) and the lower tail (ξLOW ).
Sectors Abbrv. Mean Std. dev. Skew. Kurt. ξUP ξLOW
Business Equipment BusEq 0.09 1.38 0.18 23.55 0.18 0.17
Chemicals Chems 0.08 1.15 0.07 31.61 0.25 0.22
Durable Durbl 0.07 1.37 0.38 24.89 0.21 0.19
Energy Enrgy 0.10 1.41 0.54 26.06 0.25 0.22
Health Hlth 0.08 1.14 0.78 34.35 0.26 0.19
Manufacturing Manuf 0.08 1.21 0.40 28.96 0.19 0.22
Money Money 0.09 1.13 1.02 33.72 0.25 0.21
No Durable NoDur 0.08 0.94 0.57 35.43 0.23 0.16
Other Other 0.11 1.23 0.48 21.01 0.16 0.12
Shops Shops 0.08 1.04 0.25 23.95 0.20 0.17
Telecommunications Telcm 0.07 1.19 -0.01 10.83 0.17 0.10
Utilities Util 0.07 1.21 1.22 34.03 0.20 0.10
3.3 Tail change-points
Figures 1 and 2 report the change-points obtained on the time series of the different economic
sectors, respectively for the upper and lower tails. The two panels highlight that the change-
points tend to occur in a neighborhood of the main events that characterize the last century.
One can notice the Great Depression, the recession period caused by the tightening of the
fiscal policy after the New Deal at the end of the thirties, the energy crises of the seventies,
the dot-com bubble, the Asian financial crises and the Great Recession. According to Figure
3, it is possible to note that the two crises of interest here are those exhibiting a wider shock
across the sectors, confirming the strong impact they had on the economy.
As our aim consists in studying the market behavior during the Great Depression and the
Great Recession, we focus our attention on the change-points occurring in these periods. The
key dates used as a reference point for the two crises are the 29th October 1929, known as
the Black Tuesday, and the 11th October 2007, when the stock market reaches its maximum
before falling for the subsequent two years. Tables 2 and 3 report the change-points closest
to these crucial dates, respectively for the upper and the lower tail. We should be able to
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identify a first change-point where the tails become heavier as a consequence of the shock of
the crisis and a second change-point signaling a more quiet period following the government
policies.
The first remark is that the change-points in the lower tails tend to anticipate those in
the upper tails in both crises. In particular, the Pre-crisis change-points in the lower tails
occur before the 29th October 1929 for the Great Depression and before the 11th October
2007 for the Great Recession, while most of the Pre-crisis change-points in the upper tails
occur after these dates. This signals that the market anticipated the possibility of a big
shock on the market, thus leading to a change point in the lower tails. After the crises hit
the economy, the volatility increased in the markets and bounce effects led to changes in the
upper tail.
To appreciate the severity of the two crises, tables 4 and 5 display the values of the
estimated parameters of the GP distribution fitted to the intervals preceding and following
the Pre-crisis change point. This allows us to study the change in the tail behavior before
and after the first structural break. Looking at the values of ν, the effect of the crises on both
tails and across all sectors is compelling. Less obvious is the effect on the tail parameter ξ,
but this estimate tends to suffer of instability given the large sample size typically required
for reliable inference. However, it is surely interesting to note that the Post-shock estimated
values of ξ for the Great Depression tend to be strongly positive, in line with the estimates
obtained on the whole series and reported in Table 1. Contrarily, the Post-shock estimated
values of ξ for the Great Recession are close to zero, suggesting an exponential tail decay.
Comparing the Pre-crisis lower tail change-points of the different sectors, we can study
cross-sectoral differences of the two crises when they hit the economy. According to Table 3,
there seems to be a homogeneous timing among most of the sectors in the ’29 crisis, while
this pattern is less clear in the recent crisis. The first sectors to be hit are Telecommunica-
tions, Chemicals and Money in the Great Depression, and Money and Utilities in the Great
Recession. This evidence on the Money sector is consistent with the role that banks and
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financial institutions had in both crises, as argued in the historical review of Section 3.1.
The relevance of the Money sector is confirmed by the results in Figure 4: this sector is the
one experiencing the highest number of tail change-points in the last century.
As to the difference between the two crises, we have already noticed that the pattern
of diffusion was not the same, apart for the Money sector. The Telecommunication sector
was among the first to be hit in ’29, but one of the last in the recent crisis. Furthermore,
the Health, Business Equipment and Energy sectors were not interested during the Great
Recession. Another notable difference is in the recovery time of the stock market. From
Table 3 it is evident that most of the Post-crisis change points in the Great Depression
occurred five years after the Pre-crisis change-points, while in the Great Recession for most
sectors the Post-crisis change-points occurred two-years after the Pre-crisis change-points.
This can be interpreted as an index of efficiency of the policy responses implemented by the
government. The fiscal policy carried over by the U.S. government in the 2008-2009 was a
large intervention with a substantial and immediate impact on the economy. Contrarily, the
interventions of the thirties were mostly directed to establish a suitable environment for the
transactions in the stock market.
Table 2: Upper tail change-points dates.
Great Depression Great Recession
Sectors Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Business Equipment 1930-09-30 1934-01-24 2008-09-17 -
Chemicals 1929-02-08 1931-06-02 2007-11-27 -
Durable 1930-09-30 1934-03-02 2007-11-27 -
Energy 1930-11-12 1934-01-15 2008-03-10 -
Health 1930-07-15 1934-03-02 2008-07-07 -
Manufacturing 1930-09-30 1934-08-22 2007-08-16 -
Money 1930-11-12 1934-01-30 2007-08-03 -
No Durable 1930-09-30 1934-03-02 2007-09-17 -
Other 1930-12-16 1934-03-02 2007-11-27 -
Shops 1929-09-12 1931-09-22 2007-11-12 -
Telecommunications 1931-09-22 1933-08-17 2008-03-10 2012-01-03
Utilities 1929-01-28 1931-04-25 2007-06-26 2009-07-23
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Figure 1: Upper tail change-points. Time line for each sector (lines) and identified
change-points (red crosses). The level of the upper-tail quantile qτ in the algorithm is
τ = 0.95.
Figure 2: Lower tail change-points. Time line for each sector (lines) and identified change-
points (red crosses). The level of the lower-tail quantile qτ in the algorithm is τ = 0.95.
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Figure 3: Number of tail change-points. Number of sectors (x axis) experiencing a
change-point in the lower tail in a given year (y axis).
Figure 4: Sector tail change-points. Number of change-points (x axis) experienced by
each sector (y axis) on the whole period.
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Figure 5: Sector co-crash change-points. Number of co-crash change-points (x axis)
experienced by each sector (y axis) on the whole period.
Figure 6: Number of co-crash change-points. Number of sectors-pair (x axis) experi-
encing a change-point in the co-crash probability in a given year (y axis).
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Table 3: Lower tail change-points dates.
Great Depression Great Recession
Sectors Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Business Equipment 1929-10-02 1933-10-30 - -
Chemicals 1929-09-26 1933-10-19 2007-07-25 -
Durable 1929-10-02 1939-09-18 2007-07-25 2009-10-28
Energy 1929-10-02 1941-02-14 - -
Health 1928-10-18 1930-10-08 - -
Manufacturing 1929-10-02 1931-09-12 2007-07-23 -
Money 1929-09-26 1934-05-10 2007-07-09 2009-07-02
No Durable 1929-10-02 1941-02-14 2007-07-25 -
Other 1928-12-05 1931-09-01 2007-10-18 2011-12-08
Shops 1929-10-18 1934-07-26 2007-07-23 2010-08-11
Telecommunications 1929-07-27 1931-09-23 2007-10-31 -
Utilities 1929-10-02 1939-09-18 2007-05-23 2009-07-02
Table 4: Upper tail GP parameters.
Great Depression Great Recession
Pre-shock Post-shock Pre-shock Post-shock
Sectors ν ξ ν ξ ν ξ ν ξ
Business Equipment 0.73 0.52 1.66 0.22 0.47 -0.16 1.43 -0.11
Chemicals 0.60 0.83 1.64 0.18 0.60 -0.04 1.32 0.10
Durable 1.04 0.32 1.45 0.39 0.54 0.04 1.86 -0.06
Energy 0.32 -0.01 1.19 0.14 0.64 0.07 2.34 0.01
Health 0.48 0.29 1.92 0.33 0.35 -0.01 1.00 0.01
Manufacturing 0.34 -0.04 1.49 0.28 0.38 0.20 1.62 -0.03
Money 0.92 0.42 2.24 0.17 0.35 0.05 1.60 -0.03
No Durable 0.37 0.80 1.31 0.28 0.17 0.14 1.36 -0.12
Other 0.75 0.26 2.10 0.12 0.38 0.23 1.31 -0.10
Shops 0.35 0.09 1.23 0.21 0.27 0.13 1.43 -0.11
Telecommunications 0.83 -0.12 1.19 -0.01 0.50 -0.36 1.43 0.04
Utilities 0.42 0.08 0.95 0.42 0.34 0.32 1.19 0.41
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Table 5: Lower tail GP parameters.
Great Depression Great Recession
Pre-shock Post-shock Pre-shock Post-shock
Sectors ν ξ ν ξ ν ξ ν ξ
Business Equipment 0.95 -0.06 2.06 0.12 - - - -
Chemicals 0.92 -0.12 1.43 0.33 0.35 0.20 1.55 -0.01
Durable 1.10 -0.06 1.71 0.13 0.59 0.14 2.19 -0.22
Energy 0.61 0.08 1.36 0.12 - - - -
Health 0.60 0.75 1.25 0.23 - - - -
Manufacturing 0.79 0.01 1.64 0.24 0.44 0.12 1.61 0.02
Money 0.41 0.50 1.54 0.20 0.31 0.35 1.88 -0.21
No Durable 0.64 -0.04 0.93 0.32 0.36 0.30 1.27 -0.02
Other 0.60 -0.14 1.01 0.25 0.48 0.21 1.41 -0.05
Shops 0.56 0.07 1.23 0.21 0.41 0.35 1.31 0.04
Telecommunications 0.32 0.26 0.92 0.27 0.71 -0.10 1.32 0.09
Utilities 0.56 0.12 1.53 0.06 0.45 0.24 1.67 -0.09
3.4 Co-crash and co-boom change-points
We now turn our attention to the multivariate analysis performed with the algorithm outlined
in Section 2.3. This allows us to understand the degree of contagion during the two crises,
as measured by change-points leading to a jump in the co-crash probability. Tables 6 and
7 report the change-points in ηUP and ηLOW respectively for the Great Depression and the
Great Recession.
First of all, in both crises the joint probability of a crash changes in all economic sectors.
From Figure 6 we can say that this can be considered a peculiarity of these two crises.
Furthermore, Figure 7 highlights that the change in the co-crash probability is upward,
implying an increase of systemic risk. Figure 5 confirms once again the leading role of the
financial sector in the economy.
The main difference between the two crises is in the pattern of diffusion. Indeed, the
Great Depression spreads the risk more rapidly, as all the change-points in the joint lower
tail occur between September and October 1929. Contrarily, the Great Recession is a slower
process with the first change-points occurring in July and October 2007. This is consistent
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with the different origins of the crises. The Great Depression started as a consequence of a
sudden and fast slowdown of the stock market rally. The Great Recession started with the
cooling of the Housing Market and this slowly affected the banking system and the economy
as a whole.
Table 6: Great Depression co-crash and co-boom change-points. The upper triangle
of the matrix reports the change-point dates (mm-yy) on the co-boom parameter ηUP . The
lower triangle reports the change-point dates (mm-yy) on the co-crash parameter ηLOW .
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BusEq 10-30 10-29 09-30 09-30 09-30 10-29 09-30 09-30 10-29 02-29 10-29
Chems 09-29 10-29 10-30 10-30 11-30 10-30 11-30 10-30 12-30 02-29 10-30
Durbl 10-29 10-29 11-30 09-30 06-31 09-30 09-30 09-30 12-30 02-29 10-29
Enrgy 10-29 10-29 10-29 09-30 09-30 09-30 12-30 09-30 12-30 07-29 09-30
Hlth 09-29 09-29 09-29 10-29 11-30 09-30 09-30 09-30 09-30 12-30 02-31
Manuf 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 09-30 06-31 06-31 12-30 02-29 06-31
Money 09-29 09-29 10-29 10-29 09-29 10-29 09-30 06-31 12-30 07-29 10-29
NoDur 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 09-30 12-30 02-29 04-31
Other 10-29 10-29 09-29 10-29 09-29 09-29 10-29 09-29 10-29 07-29 06-31
Shops 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 09-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 09-29 03-29 10-29
Telcm 09-29 09-29 09-29 10-29 11-29 09-29 09-29 10-29 11-29 09-29 06-29
Util 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 10-29 09-29 10-29 10-29 07-29
4 Real-time monitoring
In the previous sections, we perform a comparative analysis of the crises that hit the economy
in the last century. Since our change-points algorithm can be only used a posteriori, it gives
insights on the changes that occurred in the tail behaviour of the sectors we considered,
but does not say anything about the possibility of forecasting periods of turmoil. We now
question whether the test in Equation (5) can be used for real-time monitoring of the economy
and to possibly signal whether tail risk is increasing.
We put ourselves in the shoes of a group of economists with the task of assessing the
risk of a crisis at the beginning of 2007. How can we use the available test statistic and
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Table 7: Great Recession co-crash and co-boom change-points. The upper triangle
of the matrix reports the change-point dates (mm-yy) on the co-boom parameter ηUP . The
lower triangle reports the change-point dates (mm-yy) on the co-crash parameter ηLOW .
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BusEq 03-08 02-08 09-08 09-08 09-08 03-08 09-08 09-08 09-08 09-08 03-08
Chems 10-07 11-07 01-08 03-08 11-07 11-07 11-07 11-07 11-07 07-08 11-07
Durbl 10-07 07-07 09-08 06-08 11-07 11-07 11-07 11-07 11-07 01-08 11-07
Enrgy 10-07 10-07 07-07 09-08 01-08 08-07 01-08 09-08 01-08 09-08 08-07
Hlth 10-07 10-07 10-07 10-07 03-08 07-08 07-08 07-08 03-08 06-08 09-08
Manuf 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 10-07 08-07 11-07 11-07 11-07 01-08 08-07
Money 07-07 07-07 02-07 02-07 02-07 07-07 11-07 08-07 08-07 08-07 08-07
NoDur 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 10-07 07-07 07-07 11-07 11-07 01-08 01-08
Other 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 11-07 03-08 08-07
Shops 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 03-08 08-07
Telcm 10-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 08-08 07-07 02-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 08-07
Util 10-07 07-07 07-07 02-07 09-08 07-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 07-07 07-07
Figure 7: Co-crash index. Estimates of the tail dependence coefficient η for each pair of
economic sectors.
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the market data on the US sectors for this purpose? We consider the last S = 1000 days,
hence the data from the beginning of 2003 to the beginning of 2007 and compute the test
statistics in Equation (5). We choose this sample size because we need a sample large
enough to compute the extreme value statistic, but at the same time we want the data to
belong to the same economic regime. We retain the maximum value of Tn within the last
κ = {100, 200, 300, 400} days1. We consider different values of κ to trade-off the power of
the test with the noise induced by including more past observations. We interpret a retained
value exceeding the test critical value as a signal of changing tail behaviour, thus prompting
a possible incumbent crises.
For each sector, we repeat this procedure every day till the end of 2008 in a rolling
window fashion and display the results in Figure 8. We can see that for most of the series, a
changing tail behaviour was evident before the end of 2007, close to the peak reached by the
market on the 11th October 2007. Although we consider this date as the beginning of the
crisis, we can see from the return time series in Figure 8 that the market did not panic until
September 2008 where we can clearly observe a volatility burst in the data. Therefore, our
test statistic signals an incumbent crisis well before the market explosion, and this evidence
is strongest on the financial sector.
5 Conclusion
The collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. in 2007 and ensuing financial
instability have spurred renewed interest in the origin of large scale crises. Some have
stressed similarities across countries and historical episodes while others have emphasized
differences, both historical and as related to the specific mechanics of the shock triggering a
crisis. However, we all recognize that the Great Recession is an extraordinary, regime switch-
type, event. It is clearly different, worse, larger, than usual recessions. Thus something
happened to make the crisis fundamentally different from the usual economic downturn.
1This has the same effect of changing the parameter λ in Tn and keep the last value produced.
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Figure 8: Real-time monitoring. The azure ,green ,blue and red lines are the values
retained from Tn with κ = {100, 200, 300, 400} respectively. The horizontal black line is the
critical value at the 5% significance. The grey line represents the daily returns.
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Historically, economic downturns that involve a financial crisis are worse than the usual
downturns and stock market crashes are closely related to financial crises. Stock market
regime switches do not happen at random times, but occur near the peak of the business
cycle and after credit booms. This study adds to a recent strand of literature devoted to
the comparison between major financial and economics crises of the last century, namely
the Great Depression and the Great Recession. Unfortunately, the economic data available
to study crises are usually scanty. Thus, contrarily to the mainstream papers focusing on
the historical origins of the two crises and their macroeconomic aspects, we develop an
empirical analysis of the U.S. economy based on market data obtained from the stocks
traded on the main US stock markets. Since the largest financial crises are particularly
likely to be accompanied by stock-market crashes, we analyze the spread of the crisis across
different industries through the lens of Wall Street. Though limited in scope, our study
provides interesting insights on the transmission mechanism between stock market collapse
and economic recession. Furthermore, the availability of almost 100 years of stock market
data allows for a full coverage of the two crises as well as other US business cycle contractions.
This enable us to identify similarities and differences among major downturns.
We develop new procedures to detect change-points in the upper and lower tails of the
asset return distribution and in the co-crash and co-boom probabilities between two assets.
The iterative algorithms are fully automatic, therefore it is not necessary to specify in advance
the dates of the change-points. The algorithms identify the change-points using only the
information provided by the whole time series. Our methodology thus help in the dating
of the start and the end of a crisis. In the literature the dating of crisis events differ quite
significantly and there is also some disagreement on which events are crises. Further, typically
the start dates are late since is mostly based on contemporary accounts of the governmental
response to the crisis and not on the early effects of the crisis.
In our study we find that all the economic sectors present both a change-point around
the crucial dates of the two crises and a change-point in the dependence structure. More-
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over, they tend to anticipate the stock market collapses. This evidence strongly suggests
that both the Great Depression and the Great Recession carried a huge systemic risk and
that the market uncertainty continued for several months before the crashes. Thus our
methodological approach should be considered to update measurement systems to detect
the buildup of systemic risk. In our work we identify the systemic effect of the crisis in the
co-occurrence of a sudden negative shift in the tail risk of many sectors of the economy.
This is a distinctive landmark of both the Great Depression and the Great Recession that
deserves further scrutiny.
Even though, there are many things we do not know about the dynamics of crises, we
hope our contribution helps in developing early warning mechanisms to detect the buildup of
systemic risk in the stock market. As new data becomes available about the banking sector
and other markets, in future work we plan to extend our approach to detect systemic risk in
the probability of co-crash of both real and financial assets.
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